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This report was originally published in July 2006.  In September 2006, minor transcription errors were discovered in 
the plutonium isotopic mass-percent values reported in Table 3.5 for the suspect fuel sample SF-4-2.  This report 
has, therefore, been updated to correct these minor inconsistencies.  The original values were those for a single 
analysis of sample SF-4-2; the correct values are averages of the three analytical results obtained for SF-4-2.  
Example calculations given on pages 3.12 and 3.13 also were based on incorrect values. 
 
This revision of the report corrects the plutonium isotopic values in Table 3.5 and presents the example calculations 
given on page 3.13 using the corrected plutonium mass% values.  The example equation on page 3.12 was modified 
to provide the atom-percent values for natural uranium (instead of those of SF-4-2) to show that 0.7200 atom% 235U 
in natural uranium is 0.711 mass% 235U.  Three other transcription errors, which varied from the true values by 1 in 
the least significant figure for 239Pu in sample SF-8-1 in Table S.1 and for 238Pu, AEA, in sample SF-4-2 and for 
238Pu in sample SF-12-3 in Table 3.4, also were corrected.  Also, minor modifications to Table A.1 were made to 
improve clarity. 
 
The transcription errors corrected in this revised report were limited to the identified tables and text.  The data 
provided in the Data Package supporting this report were not affected and therefore the Data Package has not been 
revised. 
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Summary 
 
 
This report provides physical and radiochemical characterization results from examinations and 
laboratory analyses performed on ~0.5 to 0.6-inch diameter rod pieces found in the 105 K West (KW) 
Basin that were suspected to be from nuclear reactor fuel.  The characterization results will be used to 
establish the technical basis for adding this material to the contents of one of the final Multi-Canister 
Overpacks (MCOs) that will be loaded out of the KW Basin in FY2007 at a time depending on project 
priorities.  The receipt and examinations of the suspect rod pieces were performed consistent with the 
requirements of the Fluor Hanford/K Basin Closure (FH/KBC) Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP), 
KBC-29054 (Baker et al. 2006). 
 
Fifteen fuel rod pieces were found during the clean out of the KW Basin.  Based on lack of specific 
credentials, documentation, or obvious serial numbers, none of the items could be positively identified 
nor could their sources or compositions be described.  Item weights and dimensions measured in the KW 
Basin indicated densities consistent with the suspect fuel rods containing uranium dioxide (UO2), uranium 
metal, or being empty.  Measurements performed in the KW Basin showed that the items having solid 
contents have radioactivity levels above background.  Extensive review of the Hanford Site technical 
literature led to the postulation that these pieces likely were irradiated test fuel prepared to support the 
development of the Hanford “New Production Reactor,” later called N Reactor. 
 
To obtain definitive data on the composition of the suspect fuel, 4 representative fuel rod pieces, 9- to 
13.5-inches long, were selected from the 15 rod piece population.  [In the 325 Building, the suspect fuel 
rod pieces were given the designations of SF-4, SF-5, SF-8 and SF-12, which correspond to SAP 
designations for rod pieces, #4, #5, #8, and #12, respectively.]   All four had densities corresponding to 
oxide fuel.  The 4 items were shipped from the KW Basin to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
(PNNL) Radiological Processing Laboratory (RPL; also known as the 325 Building).  A PAS-1 cask and 
shielded sample container (SSC) were used to ship the selected rod pieces.  At the RPL, the suspect fuel 
rods were removed from the PAS-1 cask, placed in the hot cell, their identities confirmed, visually 
examined, and physically characterized.  The characterization confirmed the outer diameter of each item 
to be about 0.55-inch with a cladding wall thickness of about 0.031 inch.  The black to dark grey fuel 
material appeared to totally fill the cladding inner diameter and have open interconnected porosity.  The 
appearance was consistent with uranium oxide based fuels and the apparent fuel density confirmed values 
derived from KW Basin evaluations. 
 
Following physical evaluation, KBC and PNNL staff developed cutting diagrams based on SAP 
requirements and general observations of the rod pieces.  Three of the 4 fuel rods (SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12) 
were sectioned by transverse cutting with a diamond saw.  Two ~⅛-inch thick disks samples were cut 
from each of the 3 fuel rods.  One disk sample was taken from each rod near the center (samples SF-4-1, 
SF-8-1, and SF-12-3) and one sample from each rod was taken ~2 inches from an end (samples SF-4-2, 
SF-8-2, and SF-12-2).  The fourth fuel rod piece (SF-5) was stored as a contingent for later examination 
in case questions developed from results obtained from the three sectioned fuel rods.  No need for 
examining SF-5 occurred, and this rod remained in the as-shipped condition. 
 
Radiochemical analyses were performed for the six samples taken from SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12.  Phase 
identifications were performed by X-ray diffraction (XRD) on separate fuel material and cladding 
samples.  The key characterization results are summarized in Table S.1.   
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Table S.1.  Summary of Key(a) Suspect Fuel Radiochemical Analysis and Phase Identification 
SF-4 SF-8 SF-12 
Center Near End Center Near End Center Near End Analyte 
SF-4-1 SF-4-2 SF-8-1 SF-8-2 SF-12-3 SF-12-2 
Concentration µg/g Fuel Dissolved 
U total 8.99E+05 8.94E+05 8.94E+05 9.03E+05 8.90E+05 8.98E+05
237Np 1.67E+00 1.60E+00 1.24E+00 7.85E-01 1.08E+00 7.38E-01 
Pu total 4.20E+02 3.75E+02 2.93E+02 1.89E+02 2.74E+02 1.85E+02
241Am 2.92E-01 2.49E-01 9.69E-02 2.95E-02 <6.E-2 <3.E-2 
Concentration µg/g Fuel Rod Segment(b)
U total 7.67E+05 7.62E+05 7.58E+05 7.39E+05 7.37E+05 7.39E+05
237Np 1.43E+00 1.37E+00 1.05E+00 6.42E-01 8.93E-01 6.07E-01 
Pu total 3.58E+02 3.19E+02 2.48E+02 1.55E+02 2.27E+02 1.53E+02
241Am 2.49E-01 2.12E-01 8.21E-02 2.41E-02 <5.E-2 <3.E-2 
Cladding 1.46E+05 1.47E+05 1.52E+05 1.81E+05 1.66E+05 1.76E+05
Residual Solids(c) 4.51E+02 7.42E+02 4.04E+02 1.33E+03 9.57E+02 5.79E+03
SNM Isotopic Atom% of Element 
235U 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.68 0.71 
239Pu 97.71 97.93 98.27 98.66 98.58 98.96 
240Pu 2.25 2.03 1.53 0.87 1.41 1.00 
SNM Isotopic Wt% of Element 
235U 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.67 0.70 
239Pu 97.72 97.95 98.41 99.02 98.58 98.97 
240Pu 2.26 2.04 1.54 0.88 1.42 1.00 
Gamma Activity µCi/g Dissolved Fuel 
137Cs, µCi/g 495 468 355 221 304 218 
154Eu, µCi/g 0.0585 0.0469 <0.005 <0.004 <0.005 <0.003 
60Co, µCi/g 0.0108 0.0113 0.00213 0.0314 <0.0009 <0.0007 
Phase Identification (XRD) 
Fuel UO2 UO2 UO2
Cladding Zr Zr Zr 
(a)  More extensive characterization data, including radionuclide breakdown, are provided in Section 3.2. 
(b)  Fuel rod segment basis.  Basis includes dissolved fuel, cladding, and residual solids for segment sample disk.
(c)  Residual Solids are materials that did not dissolve during acid digestion in analytical preparation of the fuel. 
 
The analyses for the suspect fuel items, SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12, are similar to each other.  All three fuel 
rod items appear to contain slightly irradiated UO2 fuel, originally of natural enrichment, with zirconium 
cladding.  The uranium-235 isotopic concentrations decreased by the irradiation and became slightly 
lower than the natural enrichment of 0.72% to range from 0.67 to 0.71 atom%.  The plutonium 
concentrations, as can be derived from Table S.1, ranged from about 206 to 467 grams per metric ton of 
uranium and ranged in 239Pu concentration from about 97.7 to 99.0 atom%.  The primary gamma emitter 
was 137Cs, as would be expected for irradiated fuel. 
 
During preparation for chemical analyses, the samples from all three fuel rod pieces showed similar 
dissolution behaviors.  The cladding was unaffected by the dissolution process and the rinsed cladding 
rings were removed as the dissolution progressed.  The dissolution process, however, left small quantities 
of residue that were not soluble in the mixed nitric/hydrochloric acid used for fuel dissolution.  The 
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remaining residual solids, most likely bits of cladding from the fuel sectioning, contained little gamma or 
alpha activity in comparison with the fuel itself.  With their relatively small quantities compared with the 
dissolved fuel and low relative weights, the residual solids were taken to be negligible contributors to the 
total nuclear material in the suspect fuel rods. 
 
It also was observed for each rod piece that samples taken near the centers (SF-4-1, SF-8-1, and SF-12-3) 
had apparently endured more irradiation than the complementary samples taken from the fuel rod ends 
(SF-4-2, SF-8-2, and SF-12-2, respectively).  Thus, the 137Cs, 154Eu, 237Np, 241Am, and total plutonium 
concentrations are higher in the center samples than in the ends while the 239Pu and (generally) 235U 
atom% concentrations are lower.  These differences are more pronounced for the SF-8 and SF-12 samples 
than for the SF-4 samples.  The SF-4 fuel apparently underwent more irradiation than the SF-8 and SF-12 
samples, whose irradiation exposures seemed to be similar based on their similar radionuclide 
concentrations. 
 
Assuming irradiation in one of the Hanford production reactors, rough estimates of fuel irradiation 
exposure ranged from about 200 to 800 megawatt-days per metric ton of uranium.  The best estimate of 
cooling time (time since discharge), based on the mole ratios of 241Pu to its daughter 241Am, is about 
30 ± 6 to 42 ± 14 years (at one standard deviation).  The fuel rod construction, dimensions, and materials 
and, to a lesser extent, the cooling times are consistent with items produced during N Reactor fuel 
development in the late 1950s. 
 
The results of the analyses of the sections from three fuel rod pieces fulfilled the objectives specified by 
the SAP with no open issues.  Therefore, no additional analyses were required of the fourth rod piece 
(SF-5) that had been reserved for contingent analyses. 
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Terms and Acronyms 
 
 
Terms and acronyms used within this report are described below. 
 
Term  Explanation 
 
AEA Alpha energy analysis 
ASO Analytical Support Operations 
CoC Chain of Custody 
FH Fluor Hanford, Inc. 
GEA Gamma Energy Analysis 
HLRF High Level Radiochemistry Facility (hot cells A-C) in the 325 Building 
ICDD International Centre for Diffraction Data 
KBC Project K Basin Closure Project 
KPA Kinetic phosphorescence analysis (for uranium) 
KW K West Basin 
MCO Multi-Canister Overpack 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
PAS-1 cask “Post-Accident Sample” cask  -  Multi-use shipping cask that has been 
approved for transport of nuclear fuel and sludge on the Hanford Site under 
special controls 
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
OCRWM Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 
RPL Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (in 325 Building) 
SAP Sampling and Analysis Plan 
SAL Shielded Analytical Laboratory (lightly shielded hot cells in the 
325 Building) 
SSC shielded sample container (special lead/stainless steel pig used in the PAS-1 
cask for fuel and sludge, along with the corresponding inner rack for the 
PAS-1) 
Suspect Fuel rod pieces Fuel rod pieces in the KW Basin whose composition will be established 
through examinations and characterization at the 325 Building. 
Suspect Fuel remnants Suspect fuel rod pieces remaining after characterization and subsampling at 
the 325 Building.  This fuel material must be returned to the KW Basin. 
TIMS Thermal ionization mass spectrometry 
XRD X-ray diffraction or diffractometry 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
   
During the clean out of the 105 K West (KW) Basin, a group of 15 fuel rod pieces was found that could 
not be positively identified relative to source and composition based on the fuel geometry and lack of 
specific documentation (Ball 2005).  Extensive review of the Hanford Site technical literature(a) (Sexton 
2006) led to the postulation that these rod pieces likely were irradiated test fuel arising in support of the 
development of the Hanford “New Production Reactor”, later called N Reactor.  Table A.1 (Appendix A) 
summarizes the limited information/data collected on the 15 “Suspect Fuel” rod pieces during underwater 
examinations/characterization at the KW Basin.  The 15 suspect fuel rod pieces have lengths varying from 
3 to 22 inches.  Underwater masses ranged from less than a tenth of a pound (~45 g) to about 1.45 pounds 
(658 g).  Underwater dose rate measurement performed with an RO-7 probe varied from 1 to 11 R/hr (on 
contact) relative to the underwater background dose rate of ~1 R/hr.  Based on their geometries and 
underwater weights, the densities of the rod pieces were calculated.  One rod piece exhibited a density 
consistent with uranium metal, while nine others had densities consistent with uranium oxide and four 
evidently were “empty” cladding (i.e., indicating minimal fuel).  The remaining rod piece, believed to 
contain uranium metal, was dropped in an area on the KW Basin floor that cannot be accessed until large 
scale equipment is removed when KW is finally cleaned out. 
 
A Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) (Baker et al. 2006) was developed to establish the framework for 
characterization of the suspect fuel so that rod pieces containing significant fuel can be placed in Multi-
Canister Overpacks (MCO) for dispositioning along with other spent nuclear fuel from K Basins.  Under 
the SAP, 4 rod pieces from the population of 15 were selected for shipment to the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL) Radiological Processing Laboratory (RPL) (also known at the 325 
Building).  The rod pieces chosen for characterization were selected to be generally representative of the 
oxide fuel in the population and capable of fitting into the shipping container without in-basin size 
reduction.  Lengths thus were limited to about 14 inches.  The SAP specified that 3 of the 4 suspect fuel 
rod pieces shipped to the 325 Building were to be subjected to examination and characterization.  The 
fourth rod piece was to serve as a contingency in the event that the samples from an additional rod piece 
would be required.  The SAP specifications were based in-part on the expectation from the extensive 
literature reviews of historic Hanford documents that the oxide fuel rod pieces are from one general 
population (Baker et al. 2006). 
  
Within the SAP, the primary objectives of the fuel characterization effort were identified:  
 
1)  determination of the nuclear materials accountability values for the suspect fuel rod pieces 
being loaded into the MCO  
 
2)  generation of sufficient information to demonstrate that including the suspect fuel rod pieces 
in an MCO will not increase risk that the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 
(OCRWM) will not accept this MCO for off-site transport or final disposition at the federal 
High Level Waste (HLW) repository.    
 
                                                 
(a)  PNNL letter report 50129-RPT02, “Technical Literature Investigation of the Source of the KW Basin Suspect 
Fuel,” prepared by CH Delegard (PNNL) and transmitted via letter 50129-L02 by PA Scott (PNNL) to DR 
Duncan (FH) on December 16, 2005. 
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To meet these objectives, the specific minimum laboratory analyses required that the fuel composition be 
determined (i.e., plutonium and uranium concentrations, uranium enrichment, plutonium isotopes, and 
radionuclide isotopic content) and that the cladding material be identified (e.g., stainless steel, zircaloy, 
etc.). 
 
The characterization results from examinations and laboratory analyses performed (consistent with the 
SAP) on the subset of fuel rod pieces at the RPL are summarized in this report.  The receipt, inspections, 
physical characterization, and subsampling of the suspect fuel rod pieces are described in Section 2.0.  
Section 3.0 describes the dissolution of the fuel (analytical preparation), and presents the results of the 
phase identification (X-ray diffraction analysis) and radiochemical analysis.  Discussion and 
interpretation of the characterization results are also provided in Section 3.0.  Quality assurance measures 
are described in Section 4.0.  Appendix A includes the results from the prior in-basin characterization of 
the suspect fuel population performed by the K Basin Closure (KBC) Project.  Appendix B provides the 
final subsampling or cut diagrams for the three suspect fuel rod pieces that were analyzed, a summary of 
remnant pieces remaining after rod piece sectioning, and calculations on the make-up of suspect fuel.   
 
A technical data package containing the Chain of Custody (CoC) form, completed test instructions, 
laboratory data summary reports, and the raw data is maintained in the PNNL project records and has 
been provided to Fluor Hanford (FH) [KBC Project records, FH Safeguards (T. L. Welsh), and KBC 
Engineering (R. B. Baker and D. R. Duncan)].  Videotape was collected during the physical examinations 
and sectioning of the suspect fuel rod pieces.  Copies of these videotapes were provided to FH (R. B. 
Baker) and will be retained by PNNL project staff (A. J. Schmidt). 
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2.0 Receipt, Physical Examinations, and Subsampling 
 
 
The receipt, physical examinations, and subsampling of the suspect fuel occurred at the RPL after 
shipment from the KW Basin. 
 
 
2.1   Shipment and Receipt of Fuel at the RPL 
 
Based on guidance provided in the SAP, four pre-selected suspect fuel rod pieces (designated as #4, #5, 
#8 and #12) were verified as to identity and loaded underwater at the KW Basin into a special fuel basket, 
which was then placed into a special lead/stainless steel pig [referred to as the shielded sample container 
(SSC)].  Next, the SSC, containing the fuel rod pieces and water, was removed from the KW Basin pool, 
bagged, and then placed in a Hanford PAS-1 cask.  The loaded cask was received at the RPL on April 6, 
2006, with a CoC to document the transfer of the fuel from FH to PNNL.  The fuel shipment was 
performed under the provisions of “One-Time Request for Shipment Spent Nuclear Fuel Coupons in the 
PAS-1 Cask” (Fluor 2006).  On April 12, 2006, after being recovered from the PAS-1 cask, the SSC was 
drained of water, and the suspect fuel rod pieces were offloaded into a hot cell (A-Cell) within the High 
Level Radiochemistry Facility (HLRF) at the RPL. 
 
Table 2.1 provides a cross-reference matrix of the identification nomenclature for the suspect fuel rod 
pieces shipped to the 325 Building. 
 
Table 2.1.  Suspect Fuel Rod Piece Identification Cross Reference Matrix 
Chain of Custody 
Identification 
Sampling and 
Analysis Plan 
Identification 
Identification Used at 
the RPL 
SFP-06-004 #4 SF-4 
SFP-06-005 #5 SF-5 
SFP-06-008 #8 SF-8 
SFP-06-012 #12 SF-12 
 
 
2.2 Physical Inspections/Characterization 
 
Physical inspections of the suspect fuel occurred in the HLRF. 
 
2.2.1 Initial Examinations 
 
Upon offloading the suspect fuel rod pieces into the HLRF, initial examinations were conducted to 
confirm the identities of each rod piece and to obtain information and videotape records to establish 
subsampling plans (i.e., cutting diagrams).  The rod pieces were identified based on pictures included 
within the SAP and within PNNL Test Instructions because the rod pieces do not have unique numbering.  
The rod pieces were videotaped, measured for length and diameter, weighed, and placed into their 
respective pipe storage containers.  For each rod piece, a reference dimensional scale and color reference 
card were included during a portion of the videotaping.  Measurements and notes from the initial 
 2.1
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examinations were documented in project-specific test instructions which are included in the PNNL 
technical data package. 
 
The appearance and weights of the suspect fuel rod pieces were generally consistent with those projected 
based on the previous underwater measurements performed at the KW Basin (Baker et al. 2006).  
Figure 2.1 shows the four rod pieces in the HLRF.   
 
Observations from the initial examinations are summarized below: 
 
SF-4   Both ends of the fuel rod piece exhibit oblique tapered cuts with solid material (inferred to be fuel) 
extending and visible on both ends.  The solid material was black, granular/crystalline in appearance, and 
had surfaces that reflected light.  No brown or yellow color was observed on the solid material, which 
could have been indicative of higher oxidation states of uranium.  Figure 2.2 is a close up view of a 
taper-cut end on SF-4.  Fuel was visible ⅞ inch from one end, and 13/16 inches from the other end.  A 
crack in the cladding on one of the tapered cuts was visible.  The cladding surface was oxidized (mottled 
appearance) and some small pits were visible.  Markings on the cladding gave evidence that the rod had 
been wire-wrapped with a pitch of approximately 1 wrap per foot.  
 
SF-5  One end of SF-5 exhibited a pin fitting with a length of wire wrap still attached (Figure 2.3).  The 
distance from the end of the pin fitting to where fuel was assumed to start is ⅜ inch.  The other end the 
cladding was broken, with jagged edges exposed.  Black solid material (similar to that observed in SF-4), 
inferred to be fuel, was observed approximately ½ to ⅝ inch inside of the broken end.  The cladding 
surface was apparently oxidized (mottled appearance), with green areas in several spots, and some small 
pits were visible.  Marks from wire wrap were seen but were insufficient to estimate pitch. 
 
SF-8  One end of SF-8 was closed with a flat fitting or end cap and the other end was neatly cut.  The end 
cap was notched with what appeared to be a v or y pattern (see Figure 2.4).  The pinched or indented 
cladding wall cut likely was made using a tubing cutter.  Solid material (similar to that seen in other rod 
pieces), inferred to be fuel, was observed inside the cladding ⅜ inch inside of the cut end.  The cladding 
surface condition was similar to the other rod pieces, although scratch marks and marks from pliers or a 
vice type tool were observed.  With the marred surface, no distinct patterns left from a wire wrap could be 
identified. 
 
SF-12  One end of SF-12 exhibited a pin fitting (e.g., end cap) with a short length of wire wrap 
(Figure 2.5).  The other end of the rod piece was bent and the end had neatly cut cladding walls at an 
angle such as might be made by a tubing cutter.  Solid material (similar to that seen in other rod pieces), 
inferred to be fuel, was observed inside the cladding at a depth of ¼ inch from the bent end.  The cladding 
surface condition was similar to the SF-4 and SF-8.  Like SF-5, marks from wire wrap were found but the 
pitch could not be estimated. 
 
The initial inspections were conducted with the fuel rod pieces laid out on a clean white towel.  After the 
inspections were completed, no particulate debris was observed on the towel. 
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Figure 2.1.  Suspect Fuel Rod Pieces, from Top to Bottom, SF-12, SF-8, SF-5 and SF-4. 
SF-12 is approximately 13.3 inches long, and SF-4 is approximately 9.9 inches long. 
   
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.  Tapered Cut End on SF-4 
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Figure 2.3.  Pin Fitting with Segment of Wire Wrap on SF-5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.  Flat Fitting on SF-8.  Note the apparent 
v or y pattern of notch on fitting. 
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Figure 2.5.  Pin Fitting on SF-12 
 
2.2.2 Detailed Examinations and Sectioning 
 
After completing the initial examinations, cut plans were finalized for obtaining analytical subsamples 
from rod pieces SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12.  Appendix B provides diagrams that depict the as-sectioned fuel 
rod pieces.  A cut plan was also formulated for SF-5, but was not executed.  Additional physical 
characterization was also completed to document the dimensions (measured with a dimensional scale) and 
masses of the fuel rod pieces before subsectioning.  Daily linearity checks were performed on balances.  
Rod piece diameters were measured using uncalibrated dial calipers.  Before the measurements were 
made, the calipers were set to zero (operation was videotaped).  The diameter measurements were 
generally consistent with measurements performed using a dimensional scale and agreed with previous 
underwater measurements (Appendix A).  Table 2.2 summarizes the physical measurements, and includes 
the mass of the remnants remaining from each fuel rod piece after subsectioning.  [Additional mass and 
length information on the remnant pieces is provided in Appendix B.] 
 
For radiochemistry analysis, two ~⅛-inch thick disks samples were cut from each of the three primary 
suspect fuel rod pieces (SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12).  For SF-12, a sample solution was lost during dissolution 
(vial slipped during analytical preparation); therefore, a third sample disk was taken from the rod 
material.  Figure 2.6 shows the cutting of a section from SF-12.  One sample disk was taken from each 
rod near the center and a second sample from each rod was taken ~2 inches from an end.  An additional 
disk (~⅛-inch thick) was also obtained from near the center of each rod to provide sample material for 
X-ray diffraction (XRD) analysis of fuel and cladding.  Attempts to pick a piece of fuel from the sample 
disk or free the fuel from the cladding ring were unsuccessful (i.e., fuel exhibited significant structural 
integrity and bonding to the cladding).  Therefore, for the XRD sub-samples where a small portion of fuel 
and cladding material were required, the sample disk was cut in half.    
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Table 2.2.  Physical Characterization Measurements of Suspect Fuel Rod Pieces 
Suspect Fuel Rod Piece Parameter 
SF-4 SF-8 SF-12 SF-5(a)
Dry Mass, g (as received) 292.8 444.3 449.2 292.7 
Overall Length, inches 9.88 13.0 13.31 9.25 
Fueled Length,(b) inches 7.81 12.5 12.69 8.31 
Diameter, inches 0.55 0.55 0.56 NM(c)
Cladding thickness,(d) inches  0.031 0.031 0.031 NM(c)
Mass per Fueled Length,(e) g/axial 
inches (fueled section) 36.5 36.4 36.5 NM
(c)
 
Mass, remnant pieces,(f) after 
sectioning, g 
278.6 431.2 429.3 292.7 
(a) SF-5 was held in contingency, and was not sectioned. 
(b) Length of rod piece occupied by fuel (it is assumed all solid material observed was 
fuel).  Estimates were made of where fuel begins on closed ends of rod pieces (see 
Appendix B). 
(c) NM = not measured 
(d) Prior to sectioning, cladding thickness was estimated to be approximately 1/32 (or 
0.031) inch.  This estimate is consistent with examinations of post sectioning photos.  
(e) Calculated based on one of the completely fueled remnant segments cut from mid-
section of rod pieces (see Table B.1).  Some variation in mass per length throughout 
the fuel column is expected, leading to potential slight variations in estimating total 
fuel column mass. 
(f) Total mass of remnant pieces to be returned to the KW Basin.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.6.   Sectioning of SF-12 with Low Speed Isomet Saw.   
Water is being used a coolant/cutting lubricant.   
The outside diameter of SF-12 is 0.55 to 0.56 inch.   
A portion of the circular saw blade is shown below 
the fuel. 
 2.6
PNNL-15939, Rev. 1 
Sectioning of the suspect fuel rod pieces was performed using a Buehler Low Speed Isomet saw, 
modified for in-cell use.  A diamond wafering blade [Buehler Series 15, HC (high concentration) 
Diamond blade] was used for all cutting and water was used as a coolant/lubricant.  Use of water during 
cutting provided faster and cleaner cuts (minimizing fuel crumbling and chipping) and controlled the 
spread of fuel dust.  To minimize cross contamination, the saw blade was replaced or cleaned between 
sectioning the fuel rod pieces.  One end of each rod piece was selected as the reference end and nicked 
with the saw blade to mark and maintain orientation with the cut plan.  Rod segments that were devoid of 
obvious reference points were also nicked on one end to mark orientation.  The cut plans, notes, and 
measurements from fuel sectioning were documented directly into the controlled copy of the test 
instructions. 
 
The rod sectioning method (i.e., saw, blade, use of water, etc.) was based on prior PNNL experience with 
sectioning irradiated fuel pins for other projects.  The sectioning of the KBC suspect fuel rod pieces was 
performed very efficiently.  The cladding and fuel were cut cleanly and a typical transverse diametral cut 
of fuel/cladding was performed in about 3 to 5 minutes.  Minimal small loose fuel pieces were observed 
during the cutting.  Generally the fuel material was observed to be dark grey to black in color and have 
apparent open interconnected porosity.  Light spots noted in images of the fuel cross-sections (see 
Figure 2.6) are reflections of light off the various small surfaces of the material making up the fuel.  
Similar observations were made during prior in-basin examinations at KW.  The fuel material appeared to 
be in intimate contact with the cladding inner diameter with no looseness (i.e., there was no apparent open 
fuel-to-cladding gap).  No unique bonding material (or evidence of prior existence of bonding material) 
was observed between the bulk fuel outer diameter and inner cladding diameter. 
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3.0  Suspect Fuel Materials and Radiochemical Characterization 
Techniques and Results 
 
 
Material and radiochemical characterizations were performed on the portions of three of the suspect fuel 
rod items numbered SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12.  The sample portions were collected during subsectioning 
activities in the HLRF as described in Section 2.2.2, and were transferred to the Shielded Analytical 
Laboratory (SAL) for further preparation.  Three types of samples were collected from each fuel rod: 
 
• small (~⅛-inch × 3/16-inch) pieces of cladding 
• small particles of fuel 
• two ~⅛-inch thick transverse sawn cross-sections of fuel rod with cladding. 
 
The cladding pieces and small fuel particles were collected for phase identification by XRD.  The 
transverse cross-sectional samples were taken for chemical and radiochemical analyses of the fuel 
contained within the cladding.  The identification numbers and locations from which the cross sectional 
samples were taken are described in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1.  Fuel Cross-Section Sample Identification and Description 
Sample 
ID 
ASO(a) 
Sample ID Sample Description 
SF-4-1 06-01386 Sample section from middle (axially) of SF-4. 
SF-4-2 06-01387 Sample section taken 2⅞ inches from reference end.  Axial distance between SF-4-1 and SF-4-2 approximately 2¼ inches. 
SF-8-1 06-01388 Sample section from middle (axially) of SF-8. 
SF-8-2 06-01389 Sample section taken 2⅜ inches from reference end with flat fitting.  Axial distance between SF-8-1 and SF-8-2 approximately 3¾ inches. 
SF-12-1 06-01390 
Sample section from middle (axially) of SF-12.  Solution prepared from this 
sample subsequently was lost during manipulation in the hot cell.  The sample 
SF-12-3 was taken for analysis to replace SF-12-1. 
SF-12-3 06-01420 Sample section from middle (axially) of SF-12 taken to replace SF-12-1. 
SF-12-2 06-01391 Sample section taken 1⅞ inches from reference end with pin fitting.  Axial distance between SF-12-2 and SF-12-3 approximately 4½ inches. 
(a)  ASO is Analytical Support Operations. 
 
The results from the XRD and the chemical/radiochemical analyses are reported, respectively, in Sections 
3.1 and 3.2.  Some generalizations and interpretations from the analytical findings are presented in 
Section 3.3. 
 
 
3.1 X-Ray Diffractometry Measurements 
 
One sample of cladding and one sample of fuel were taken from each of the three tested suspect fuel rod 
pieces, SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12.  The analytical methods and sample phase identification results are 
described in this section. 
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3.1.1 X-Ray Diffractometry Sample Preparation and Analysis 
 
The cladding and particle samples were taken for characterization by XRD.  The XRD technique was 
used to identify crystalline phases in the cladding and fuel particles.  Samples were prepared for XRD 
analyses following standard RPL procedures.(a)
 
Each of the cladding samples were slightly curved because of their origin from the cylindrical suspect fuel 
rods.  Each sample was mounted intact, convex-upward, on adhesive paper which, in turn, was mounted 
on adhesive clay.  Each sample on paper was pressed into the clay until the upper part of the curved 
surface was in the calibrated plane of the sample mount.  In this orientation, the outer surface of the fuel 
rod (water side) was interrogated by the X-ray beam.  The cladding sample mounts then were covered 
with a Kapton-windowed plastic sample holder and glued at all seams for radioactive contamination 
control.  Kapton is a high strength polyimide that is X-ray translucent and X-ray indifferent (i.e., has no 
distinct X-ray pattern) and used in a film form in this application. 
 
The fuel samples were crushed and ground to fine powders in the hot cell using a mortar and pestle.  Each 
powder was blended with a portion of Al2O3 (corundum) powder, Standard Reference Material 674, 
obtained from the National Bureau of Standards (NBS; this organization is now called the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST).  The Al2O3 powder was used as an internal standard to 
calibrate the diffraction angle.  The fuel particles were friable and crushed without undue effort.  The fuel 
and Al2O3 powders were crushed and blended as slurries in an isoamyl acetate solution of collodion.  
Each blended slurry then was pipetted onto a glass microscope slide and allowed to cure, drying to form a 
film of the mixed powders.  The slides were removed from the hot cell, wrapped in thin foils of Kapton, 
and taped for contamination control. 
 
Both the metal cladding and the powder fuel samples were analyzed by an established RPL procedure(b) 
on a Scintag PAD V X-ray diffractometer.  The XRD scans were gathered using copper Kα X-radiation 
over the range 20 to 50 degrees, 2-θ (theta), with 0.02-degree step size and a counting time of 2.0 seconds 
per step.  The scans were evaluated with the aid of JADE software (version 7.5, Materials Data Inc., 
Livermore, CA) and the peaks compared with the PDF-2 release 2005, version 2.05, International Centre 
for Diffraction Data (ICDD) powder diffraction file library to help identify phases in the samples.  
 
3.1.2 X-Ray Diffractometry Results 
 
Cladding 
 
The XRD scans for the three cladding samples, given in Figure 3.1, are adjusted in the y-axis to allow 
their ready comparison.  The scans are presented with a background blank scan of the clay that was used 
as a pliable adhesive to hold the adhesive paper (Post-it note paper) on which each cladding sample was 
mounted. 
 
                                                 
(a)  RPL-PIP-4, Rev. 4, “Preparing Sealed Radioactive Samples for XRD and Other Purposes.” 
(b)  PNNL-RPG-268, Rev. 2, “Solids Analysis, X-Ray Diffraction.” 
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Figure 3.1.  XRD Scans for SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12 Cladding Samples and the Mounting Clay Blank 
 
It is seen that the scans for the three cladding samples are remarkably similar and that the mounting clay 
(blank) provided a number of prominent peaks to all of the scans.  By visual comparison, however, it can 
be seen that peaks are present in the cladding scans that are not present in the clay.  The most conspicuous 
of the non-clay peaks appear at about 32.1, 35.0, and 36.7 degrees 2-θ.  These peaks are displaced about 
0.1 degrees to higher 2-θ from the most prominent peaks for zirconium metal at 32.0, 34.8, and 
36.5 degrees 2-θ as seen by comparison with the “stick figure” diffraction pattern for zirconium, also 
given in Figure 3.1.  Another (but weaker) peak for zirconium at 48.0 degrees 2-θ is overlain by a clay 
peak.  Given the curved surface of the fuel cladding, which certainly caused peak shifting and broadening, 
this coincidence of peak locations allows a confident identification of the cladding phase as zirconium for 
all three samples, SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12. 
 
Zirconium dioxide, ZrO2, also might be expected to be present on the surface of the zirconium cladding 
and be identifiable by XRD.  Indeed, as found by visual observation in the SAL, each of the cladding 
samples had the shiny black ZrO2 patina that is found for zirconium that has been passivated in steam, 
high temperature liquid water, or furnace treatment in air.  However, the XRD pattern for ZrO2 has only 
two peaks in the range 20-50 degrees 2-θ, and both of these peaks coincide with peaks from the 
underlying clay.  Therefore, a positive identification of ZrO2 in the SR-4, SF-8, or SF-12 samples cannot 
be made based on the XRD data. 
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A single additional peak that cannot be assigned to the clay, to zirconium metal, or to ZrO2 appears for 
the SF-4 cladding at about 32.6 degrees 2-θ (indicated by the asterisk in Figure 3.1).  Identification of a 
phase based on this single peak cannot be made with confidence. 
 
Fuel 
 
The XRD scans for the three fuel particle samples are shown in Figure 3.2.  The three scans, displaced 
from each other in the y-axis to allow comparison, are remarkably similar.  The XRD stick figure for 
Al2O3, also given in Figure 3.2, shows the locations, at about 25.6, 35.1, 37.8, and 43.3 degrees 2-θ, of the 
internal standard peaks in the scans for the fuel samples.  The three remaining prominent peaks at 28.2, 
32.7, and 46.9 degrees 2-θ are fit very well by uranium dioxide, UO2, as seen by comparison with the 
stick figure diffraction pattern for UO2.    
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Figure 3.2.  XRD Scans for SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12 Fuel Samples 
 
Five other small peaks, at about 27.1, 31.3, 33.7, 41.5, and 44.9 degrees 2-θ, are seen in most scans.  
Assignment of these peaks to higher uranium oxides was not successful.  Such oxides might be expected 
from oxidation of the fuel underwater or by air.  However, the fuel samples taken for XRD were retrieved 
from the interior of the fuel rods and were only exposed to water for brief periods during cutting.  The 
peaks also do not correspond to zirconium or ZrO2. 
 
Based on survey of the ICDD XRD files, the peaks were most closely fit by plutonium oxide fluoride, 
PuOF, or cesium thorium oxide, Cs2ThO3, and by platinum oxide, PtO.  The peaks associated with these 
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phases are indicated in Figure 3.2.  None of these three phases are consistent with the chemical analyses 
as presented in the following section of this report.  Isomorphous uranium analogs of the two actinide 
phases, i.e., UOF for PuOF and Cs2UO3 for Cs2ThO3, may be suggested.  However, the preparations of 
ternary oxides of the composition M2UO3 have not been successful and the existence of compounds like 
Cs2UO3 in the suspect fuel is unlikely.  Keller (1972) states, “It therefore seems very improbable that 
alkali metal uranates(IV) . . . exist.”  Similarly, no evidence for the existence of UOF was found in the 
technical literature.  Therefore, no definitive phase assignments may be made based on these minor peaks. 
 
Hence, both the cladding and fuel have minor potential phases that are not definitely identified with this 
analytical method.  The base primary indicated phases composing the cladding and fuel are identified.  It 
is not unusual for XRD analyses to have “unknowns” when evaluating real world materials from the field.   
 
 
3.2 Chemical and Radiochemical Analyses 
 
Chemical and radiochemical analyses performed on the fuel materials present in the six transverse cross-
sections taken (two each) from the three analyzed suspect fuel items were made in accordance with the 
SAP requirements and the ASO QA Plan.(a)  The locations of the six samples are described in Table 3.1.  
The chemical and radiochemical analyses were performed according to established analytical procedures 
and began with a stepwise digestion of the fuel materials in acid.  The procedures used in the digestion 
and analyses, and the SAP sample QC criteria, are described in Table 3.2.  The cross-sectional fuel 
sample weight data are presented in Table 3.3. 
 
3.2.1 Sample Dissolution and Digestion 
 
The sample disks cut from the suspect fuel were first heated to constant weight to drive out any water 
remaining from the cutting operation.  Because the material(s) of construction of the cladding were not 
known, the acid digestions of the fuel sample sections were undertaken in a graded fashion.  The 
dissolution procedure, as written, called for mixed 4 molar (M) nitric acid (HNO3) and 4 M hydrochloric 
acid (HCl).  The mixed HNO3/HCl solution would have attacked stainless steel, a potential cladding 
material, or other iron-based alloys.  Instead, 4 M HNO3, which does not significantly attack stainless 
steel, was used first without any added HCl.   
 
The samples with portions of 4 M HNO3 were heated in polypropylene vials to about 95°C.  The acid and 
samples were observed to react during heating, releasing bubbles and forming a yellow solution as would 
be expected for the reaction of uranium or UO2 with HNO3.  A video camera inside the hot cell was used 
to make the detailed visual observations.  The cladding, however, remained apparently unaffected by the 
acid treatment.  The acid was added in several portions, with heating, until only the cladding and a small 
amount of small black particulate solids remained undissolved.  A total volume of 28 milliliters (ml) of 
4 M HNO3 was added but the final solution volumes were lower due to evaporation. 
 
The cladding from each cross-sectional rod sample had the form of a ring.  The rings were retrieved from 
each digestion vial, rinsed with deionized water with the rinsate collected in the digestion vials, and dried 
to constant weight.  The cladding weights are shown in Table 3.3.  Each cladding ring appeared to be free 
of residual fuel and had a shiny black patina on its outer surface.  The inside of the rings, i.e., next to the 
fuel, appeared to be slightly pitted or scored.  The cut surfaces of the cladding rings showed burrs. 
 
(a)  ASO-QA-001, Rev. 4, “Analytical Support Operations (ASO) Quality Assurance Plan.” 
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Table 3.2.  Digestion and Chemical/Radiochemical Analytical Procedures and SAP Sample QC Criteria 
Analysis 
Objective 
Procedure 
Number Procedure Title 
Req. Method 
Detection 
Limit (MDL) 
Preparative 
Duplicate 
(Precision)
Blank Spike 
(Accuracy)(a)
Calib. Verif./
Counter 
Control(b)
Lab Prep. 
Duplicates(c) 
per Batch 
Acid Digestion PNL-ALO-129 HNO3-HCl Acid Extraction of Solids Using a Dry-Block Heater NA     NA NA NA NA
U/KPA(d) RPG-CMC-4014 Uranium by Kinetic Phosphorescence Analysis 10 µg/g ± 20% ± 20% ± 7.5% 1 
RPG-CMC-455 Separation of Uranium and Plutonium for Isotopic Analysis by Mass Spectrometry U-TIMS(e)
PNNL-98523-264 Mass Spectrometer Isotopic Analysis 
NA ± 20% ± 20% ± 2% 1 
RPG-CMC-455 Separation of Uranium and Plutonium for Isotopic Analysis by Mass Spectrometry 
RPG-CMC-496 Coprecipitation Mounting of Actinides for Alpha Spectroscopy 
Total Pu – AEA(f)
RPG-CMC-422 Solutions Analysis: Alpha Spectrometry 
5.0 µCi/g ± 20% ± 20% [See Section 4.1](h) 1 
RPG-CMC-455 Separation of Uranium and Plutonium for Isotopic Analysis by Mass Spectrometry Pu – TIMS(e)
PNNL-98523-264 Mass Spectrometer Isotopic Analysis 
NA ± 20% ± 20% ± 2% 1 
Am-241 – GEA(g) RPG-CMC-450 Gamma Energy Analysis (GEA) and Low-Energy Photon Spectrometry (LEPS) 15.0 µCi/g ± 20% ± 20% 
2 sigma  
(SPC) 1 
PNL-ALO-4015 Analysis of Soil and Sediment Samples for Actinides and Sr-90 Np – AEA(f)
RPG-CMC-422 Solutions Analysis: Alpha Spectrometry 
5.0 µCi/g ± 20% ± 20% [See Section 4.1](h) 1 
(a)  All matrix spike recoveries should be within 25%. 
(b)  Counter instruments will be checked daily with counter control samples to ensure performance is within statistical process control criterion of 2-sigma SPC 
(Statistical Process Control).   
(c)  Laboratory preparative duplicate is an aliquot of one of the original samples processed in duplicate through the preparative processes. 
(d)  KPA is Kinetic Phosphorescence Analysis. 
(e)  TIMS is Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry. 
(f)  AEA is Alpha Energy Analysis. 
(g)  GEA is Gamma Energy Analysis. 
(h)  In accordance with ASO QA Plan, post preparative blank and matrix spikes were performed for Pu-AEA and Np-AEA.  Additionally for Pu-AEA, an 
isotopic tracer (internal standard) was added to each sample. 
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Table 3.3.  Fuel Sample Weights and Mass Balance 
Sample ID Gross Sample Weight, g 
Cladding 
Weight, g
Residual Solids 
Weight, g 
Net Weight 
Dissolved Fuel, g 
Residual Solids, 
Wt% of Fuel 
SF-4-1 4.4309 0.6484 0.0020 3.7805 0.053 
SF-4-2 4.4450 0.6525 0.0033 3.7892 0.087 
SF-8-1 4.2130 0.6397 0.0017 3.5716 0.048 
SF-8-2 3.7566 0.6781 0.0050 3.0735 0.162 
SF-12-3 3.9345 0.6533 0.0228 3.2584 0.695 
SF-12-2 4.0734 0.7180 0.0039 3.3515 0.116 
 
 
The solution samples with black residual particulate solids were treated by the addition of 8 ml of 4 M 
HCl to the original HNO3 and left for three days at cell temperature (~30°C).  The residual solids were 
apparently unaffected after the three-day contact.  The samples then were heated to ~95°C for two hours.  
Still, no additional dissolution was observed.  At this point, the contents of the vial for one of the SF-12 
samples (the sample was designated as SF-12-1) were spilled during handling.  A replacement sample 
(designated SF-12-3; see Table 3.1) was taken from the remaining material from this rod, dried to 
constant weight, and treated with 25 ml of HNO3 to bring this sample to the same point as the remaining 
five undisturbed samples. 
 
As seen in the next section, efforts to dissolve the residual solids were unsuccessful.  Because the 
radionuclide concentrations in the undissolved residues were small, it was decided to separate the 
solutions from the residual solids.  The residual solids were rinsed and the rinses added to the dissolved 
fuel.  The solutions for all six samples, separated from the cladding rings and the residual solids, then 
were treated with roughly equal volumes of 4 M HCl.  The solutions weights and densities were measured 
and the solutions analyzed for uranium and radionuclide concentrations according to the procedures given 
in Table 3.2. 
 
3.2.2 Treatment and Analysis of Residual Solids 
 
In the mean time, the residual solids from the lost sample SF-12-1 were used to test dissolution methods.  
In the first attempt, the solution was removed from the salt-and-pepper colored residual solids and a 
mixture of 3-parts HCl and 1-part HNO3, both as their concentrated reagents (i.e., aqua regia), were added 
to give about 1-ml total solution volume.  No apparent solids dissolution was observed even after 1-hour 
heating at 95°C.  The solution was removed and another portion of aqua regia added to the vial with 
solids.  Again, however, 3-hours of contact at cell temperature failed to dissolve any additional solids. 
 
The solution was removed by pipet and ~50 microliters (µl) of concentrated hydrofluoric acid (HF) 
added.  The video camera was placed to view the flat bottom of the digestion vial so that any reaction 
signs (bubbling, swirling, solids disappearance or growth) could be readily seen.  Again, however, there 
was no apparent reaction.  Two drops (about 100 µl) of concentrated (~16 M) HNO3 were added to the 
vial with residual solids and HF.  No reaction was observed.  Then, 2-ml of concentrated HNO3 and 4-ml 
of water were added to the vial.  This would make ~5 M HNO3 and ~0.24 M HF.  The vial with contents 
was heated 20 minutes to 95°C and then left overnight at room temperature.  Again, no change in the 
solids amount or appearance could be discerned. 
 
The residual solids were separated from the solution and removed from the hot cell for radiometric 
examination.  The solids were counted by GEA and found to contain 0.531 microcuries (µCi) of 137Cs but 
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no other detectible gamma activity.  Assuming that the solids weighed 10 milligrams (about half of the 
residual solids seen for the companion sample SF-12-3), the specific activity was about 50 µCi 137Cs per 
gram (g) of sample.  As will be seen, the specific activity of the dissolved SF-12-3 fuel sample was about 
300 µCi 137Cs/g, i.e., about 6-times higher than the 137Cs concentration in the residue. 
A particle from the residual solid material was measured by a handheld beta/gamma probe and found to 
register about 50,000 counts per minute.  When tested by an alpha probe, the count rate was about 50 
counts per minute.  Had the solid speck been undissolved plutonium oxide (assuming 1% detection 
efficiency and 1 mg solid weight), the alpha count rate would have been about 108 counts per minute.  An 
estimate of the plutonium concentration in the residual solids can be made based on the ratio of plutonium 
to 137Cs for the six analyzed fuel segments (about 0.84 µg Pu per µCi 137Cs; as will be seen in Figure 3.3).  
If this ratio holds for the undissolved residues, the plutonium concentration would be about 45 µg Pu per 
gram of residue based on the 137Cs analysis.  As will be seen, sample SF-12-3 contained about 270 µg Pu 
per gram of dissolved fuel, about 6-times higher than that in the residue. 
 
Though the residual solids from sample SF-12-1 were subjected to extensive leaching contacts, little 
change in solids quantity was noticed.  As seen in Table 3.3, the solids residues represented 0.7% or less 
of the dissolved fuel weight.  The radiometric testing of the leached residues also showed about 6-fold 
lower specific activity when compared with the specific activity of the dissolved fuel materials 
themselves.  Therefore, the potential contributions of the residual solids to the total fuel (versus cladding) 
activity was considered to be negligible (i.e., 0.1% or less).  No further effort was expended to 
characterize the residual undissolved solids. 
 
3.2.3 Solution Analysis Results 
 
The results of the solution analyses, given in terms of the concentration with respect to the dissolved fuel 
segment solids and taken from the analytical reports, are provided in Table 3.4.  Replicate KPA and AEA 
data were obtained for sample SF-12-3 and replicate TIMS data obtained for SF-4-2.  The replicate 
SF-12-3 KPA and AEA results were averaged.  The replicate for the SF-4-2 uranium and plutonium 
isotopic TIMS analyses each was run in duplicate in the mass spectrometer.  The results from the 
duplicates were averaged to provide the estimate for the second replicate.  The values used in subsequent 
calculations were obtained by averaging the first and second replicate values.  The selected values used in 
subsequent evaluations are provided under their respective columns in Table 3.4 for samples SF-12-3 
(KPA and AEA) and SF-4-2 (TIMS).  The results are described in further detail according to the 
analytical technique in the following sections. 
 
Uranium Concentration by KPA 
 
Uranium concentrations were determined by KPA.  Consistent with the observation of UO2 in the XRD 
analyses of the fuel samples, the uranium concentrations were high in all three fuel items, ranging from 
890,000 to 903,000 µg/g of dissolved fuel, or 89.0 to 90.3 wt%.  Within the ± 4% KPA relative 
measurement uncertainty, this number is equivalent to the 88.15 wt% concentration of uranium in 
stoichiometric UO2. 
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Table 3.4.  Suspect Fuel Radiochemical Analytical Results As-Reported 
SF-4 SF-8 SF-12 Replicates 
Analysis Center  Near End(a) Center 
Near  
End Center
(b) Near  
End 1
st 2nd
(Run 1 & 2)
µg/g Fuel Dissolved KPA SF-4-1 SF-4-2 SF-8-1 SF-8-2 SF-12-3 SF-12-2 SF-12-3 
U 8.99E+05 8.94E+05 8.94E+05 9.03E+05 8.90E+05 8.98E+05 8.92E+05 8.88E+05 
Atom% TIMS SF-4-1 SF-4-2 SF-8-1 SF-8-2 SF-12-3 SF-12-2 SF-4-2 
233U <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
234U 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.004 
235U 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.67 
236U 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.007 
238U 99.32 99.32 99.32 99.28 99.31 99.28 99.31 99.33 99.32 
238Pu, AEA 0.00222 0.00205 0.00160 0.00070 0.00136 0.00104 0.00128(c) 0.00143(c)
238Pu 0.011 0.028 0.144 0.360 <0.001 0.019 0.051 0.0040.005 
239Pu 97.71 97.93 98.27 98.66 98.58 98.96 98.04 97.80 97.83 
239Pu, 
renorm’d.(d) 97.72 97.96 98.42 99.02 98.58 98.97 NA 
240Pu 2.25 2.03 1.53 0.87 1.41 1.00 1.89 2.19 2.15 
241Pu 0.021 0.010 0.031 0.06 0.004 0.016 0.013 0.009 0.006 
242Pu 0.002 0.002 0.020 0.046 0.004 0.009 <0.001 0.003 0.005 
µCi/g Fuel Dissolved AEA SF-4-1 SF-4-2 SF-8-1 SF-8-2 SF-12-3 SF-12-2 SF-12-3 
237Np 1.18E-03 1.13E-03 8.71E-04 5.53E-04 7.60E-04 5.20E-04 7.48E-04 7.71E-04 
238Pu 1.59E-01 1.31E-01 8.01E-02 2.25E-02 6.35E-02 3.29E-02 6.22E-02 6.48E-02 
239,240Pu 2.76E+01 2.45E+01 1.89E+01 1.20E+01 1.77E+01 1.18E+01 1.83E+01 1.70E+01 
µCi/g Fuel Dissolved GEA SF-4-1 SF-4-2 SF-8-1 SF-8-2 SF-12-3 SF-12-2 
54Mn 2.18E-02 2.13E-02 <3.0E-03 6.78E-02 <2.0E-03 <2.0E-03 
60Co 1.08E-02 1.13E-02 2.13E-03 3.14E-02 <9.0E-04 <7.0E-04 
137Cs 4.95E+02 4.68E+02 3.55E+02 2.21E+02 3.04E+02 2.18E+02 
154Eu 5.85E-02 4.69E-02 <5.0E-03 <4.0E-03 <5.0E-03 <3.0E-03 
239Pu <3.0E+02 <2.0E+02 <2.0E+02 <2.0E+02 <2.0E+02 <2.0E+02 
241Am 1.00E+00 8.53E-01 3.32E-01 1.01E-01 <2.0E-01 <1.0E-01 
NA 
(a)  Isotopic results for sample SF-4-2 are averages of the first and second replicate results.  The second replicate value is the 
average of the Run 1 and Run 2 values. 
(b)  U and 237Np, 238Pu, and 239,240Pu AEA results for sample SF-12-3 are averages of the first and second replicate results. 
(c)  Based on SF-12-3 values. 
(d)  The isotopic atom% concentrations for plutonium were renormalized to sum to 100% based on the 238Pu AEA results.  
Because of the abundance of 239Pu, the difference between the as-analyzed and renormalized atom% values are manifest only 
for this isotope. 
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Uranium and Plutonium Isotopic Analyses by TIMS 
 
The isotopic compositions of the uranium and plutonium were determined by chemical separation and 
purification of the uranium and plutonium fractions followed by thermal ionization mass spectrometry, or 
TIMS.  The TIMS analyses showed the uranium to be slightly depleted from the natural concentration of 
uranium-235 (235U) of 0.7200 atom% (Browne et al. 1986), ranging from 0.67 to 0.71 atom% (at 
± 0.01 atom%).  Slight amounts of 236U, ranging from 0.003 to 0.009 atom% (at ± 0.001 atom%), give 
additional evidence for the depletion in 235U to be caused by irradiation and not because the uranium is 
from the tails of a uranium isotopic enrichment process. 
 
Uranium irradiation is also consistent with the isotopic concentrations of the associated plutonium.  The 
predominant plutonium isotope is plutonium-239, 239Pu, with concentrations ranging from about 97.7 to 
99.0 atom%.  The 240Pu isotopic concentration ranges from 0.87 to 2.25 atom%. 
 
Isotopic analysis of 238Pu is complicated by the potential presence of the mass 238 isobar from 238U.  For 
the suspect fuel samples, in which the 238U concentration exceeds the 238Pu concentration by a factor of 
about 108, even trace uranium contamination in the plutonium TIMS analytical preparative sample can 
overwhelm the 238Pu.  Therefore, the 238Pu concentration is determined more reliably by AEA.  The 238Pu 
values as determined by AEA and by TIMS are compared on adjacent lines in Table 3.4.  It is seen that 
even with careful purification, the TIMS analyses for 238Pu are from ~5 to ~500-times higher than those 
found by AEA. 
 
Because the 238Pu concentration is determined more reliably by AEA than by TIMS, the AEA results are 
accepted.  The isotopic atom% concentrations were renormalized to sum to 100% based on the 238Pu AEA 
results.  Because of its abundance, the effect of the renormalization on atom% values is manifest only in 
the 239Pu.  The renormalized results for 239Pu are given in Table 3.4 just below the as-analyzed 239Pu 
results from TIMS. 
 
Alpha Energy Analyses (AEA) 
 
Plutonium, as 238Pu and 239,240Pu, and neptunium, as 237Np, were determined by anion exchange separation 
from the starting solution, coprecipitation with neodymium fluoride onto counting disks, and AEA.  The 
energies of the three named analytes are sufficiently different that they can be measured in a single 
spectral analysis.  The energies of 239Pu and 240Pu are nearly identical such that only their sum can be 
measured.  Americium-241 is also a significant alpha emitter but its energy is nearly identical to that of 
238Pu.  The anion exchange separation technique is sufficient to reject the 241Am from the plutonium and 
eliminate 241Am as an interference in the 238Pu analysis.  The concentrations of 237Np, 238Pu, and 239,240Pu 
in units of µCi/g dissolved fuel are reported in Table 3.4. 
 
The AEA show that the dominant analyzed source of alpha activity, at about 12-28 µCi/g of dissolved 
fuel, is 239,240Pu.  The 238Pu concentrations range from 0.022 to 0.16 µCi/g.  The 237Np concentrations 
range from 0.0005 to 0.001 µCi/g.  In comparison, the 241Am alpha activity, as derived from the 
equivalent GEA results, ranges from <0.1 to 1 µCi/g.   
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Gamma Energy Analysis (GEA) 
 
Samples of each digestion solution were counted directly by gamma detectors for GEA.  The predominant 
radionuclide observed in all samples (Table 3.4) was the fission product, 137Cs.  Fission product 
europium-154 (154Eu) was found in samples from SF-4.  Americium-241 (241Am) was found in detectible 
levels for samples taken from SF-4 and SF-8 and was below detection in SF-12.  The activation products 
manganese-54 and cobalt-60 (54Mn and 60Co) were found for both SF-4 and SF-8.  Plutonium-239 has a 
relatively high detection limit by this method and was not found in any sample. 
 
3.2.4 Mass-Based Concentrations 
 
Isotopic compositions of uranium and plutonium, expressed as weight percentages, and concentrations of 
the actinides (uranium, neptunium, plutonium, and americium) in the dissolved fuel on mass bases are 
provided in Table 3.5 as derived from the analytical data given in Table 3.4.  The methods used to 
determine the mass-based concentrations are described in this section. 
 
Table 3.5.  Suspect Fuel Radiochemical Analytical Results on Weight Bases 
SF-4 SF-8 SF-12 
SF-4-1 SF-4-2 SF-8-1 SF-8-2 SF-12-3 SF-12-2 Analysis 
Center Near End Center Near End Center Near End
TIMS Mass% 
233U <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 
234U 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.006 
235U 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.67 0.70 
236U 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 
238U 99.32 99.33 99.33 99.29 99.32 99.29 
238Pu, AEA 0.00221 0.00204 0.00160 0.00069 0.00135 0.00104 
239Pu 97.72 97.95 98.41 99.02 98.58 98.97 
240Pu 2.26 2.04 1.54 0.88 1.42 1.00 
241Pu 0.021 0.010 0.031 0.061 0.004 0.016 
242Pu 0.002 0.002 0.020 0.047 0.004 0.009 
KPA, AEA, 
GEA, TIMS µg/g Dissolved Fuel 
U 8.99E+05 8.94E+05 8.94E+05 9.03E+05 8.90E+05 8.98E+05
237Np 1.67E+00 1.60E+00 1.24E+00 7.85E-01 1.08E+00 7.38E-01
238Pu 9.29E-03 7.65E-03 4.68E-03 1.31E-03 3.71E-03 1.92E-03
239Pu 4.10E+02 3.67E+02 2.88E+02 1.87E+02 2.70E+02 1.83E+02
240Pu 9.49E+00 7.64E+00 4.51E+00 1.66E+00 3.88E+00 1.86E+00
241Pu 9.E-02 4.E-02 9.E-02 1.E-01 1.E-02 3.E-02 
242Pu 9.E-03 8.E-03 6.E-02 9.E-02 1.E-02 2.E-02 
Pu total 4.20E+02 3.75E+02 2.93E+02 1.89E+02 2.74E+02 1.85E+02
241Am 2.92E-01 2.49E-01 9.69E-02 2.95E-02 <6.E-2 <3.E-2 
KPA, AEA, 
GEA, TIMS µg/g Fuel Rod Section 
U 7.67E+05 7.62E+05 7.58E+05 7.39E+05 7.37E+05 7.39E+05
237Np 1.43E+00 1.37E+00 1.05E+00 6.42E-01 8.93E-01 6.07E-01
Pu total 3.58E+02 3.19E+02 2.48E+02 1.55E+02 2.27E+02 1.53E+02
241Am 2.49E-01 2.12E-01 8.21E-02 2.41E-02 <5.E-2 <3.E-2 
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TIMS 
 
The TIMS results presented in Table 3.4 in terms of atom percentages for the uranium and plutonium 
isotopes are given on a mass percentage basis in Table 3.5.  The mass percentage concentrations were 
calculated by the following equation as illustrated by the calculation for 235U in natural uranium: 
 
%711.0=
]051.238×2745.99+046.236×000.0+044.235×7200.0+041.234×0055.0+040.233×000.0[
044.235×7200.0
×%100
=∑ ]massatomic×isotope%Atom[
massatomic×isotope%Atom
×%100=isotope%Mass
 
 
It is seen that the mass percent concentration values are very near the atom percent concentration values. 
 
The renormalized plutonium isotope atom% concentrations based on the 238Pu AEA values (given in 
Table 3.4) were used to calculate the plutonium isotope mass% concentrations given in Table 3.5. 
 
Actinide Element Concentrations 
 
The mass concentrations for the actinides uranium, neptunium, plutonium, and americium, shown in 
Table 3.5, are presented based on the dissolved fuel only and based on the total weight of the cut fuel rod 
section, including fuel, cladding, and undissolved residue.  The uranium concentrations in the dissolved 
fuel, about 90 wt%, were presented in Table 3.4 on a mass basis and discussed in the section describing 
the KPA findings.  Because the cladding comprised about 15 to 18% of the total cut fuel rod mass, the 
uranium concentrations in the entire fuel rod samples were about 74 to 77 wt%.  The plutonium 
concentrations ranged from about 0.02 to 0.04 wt% of the fuel rod, the neptunium concentrations (all as 
neptunium-237, 237Np) were about 0.0001 wt% (or about one part per million), and the americium 
concentrations as 241Am were <0.000002 to 0.000008 wt%. 
 
Actinide Isotope Mass Concentrations 
 
The mass concentrations of the individual neptunium, plutonium, and americium isotopes are presented in 
Table 3.5.  The 237Np, 238Pu, and 241Am mass concentrations were calculated by dividing their 
concentrations, expressed as µCi per gram of dissolved fuel, by the specific activities of the individual 
isotopes (given in Table 3.6). 
 
Table 3.6.  Isotope Properties (Browne et al. 1986) 
Isotope Half-Life, y Specific Activity, Ci/g Isotope (a)
237Np 2.140×106 7.047×10-4
238Pu 8.774×101 1.712×101
239Pu 2.411×104 6.202×10-2
240Pu 6.563×103 2.269×10-1
241Pu 1.44×101 1.028×102
242Pu 3.763×105 3.925×10-3
241Am 4.327×102 3.427×100
(a)  Specific activity calculated from half-life and atomic mass. 
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The mass concentrations for 239Pu and 240Pu were calculated from their combined activities as measured 
by AEA (in Ci 239,240Pu/g of sample), their individual contributions to their activities, as measured by 
mass spectrometry, and their specific activities.  For example, the isotopic mass concentrations for 239Pu 
were calculated using the following formula, as illustrated for sample SF-4-2: 
 
sampleg
Pug10×67.3
=
g/PuCi10×269.2×04.2+g/PuCi10×202.6×95.97
%95.97
×
g
PuCi10×45.2
=
Pu.Act.Spec×Pu%MassTIMS+Pu.Act.Spec×Pu%MassTIMS
Pu%MassTIMS
×
sampleg
PuCi
=
sampleg
g,Pu
2394
24012392
240,2395
240240239239
239240,239239
_
__
_
 
 
The 240Pu concentrations were calculated in a similar manner. 
 
The 241Pu and 242Pu mass concentrations were calculated based on their mass ratios to 239Pu, as 
determined by TIMS, times the respective 239Pu concentrations.  Because the 241Pu and 242Pu 
concentrations were near or at their TIMS detection limits, the mass concentrations are only reported to 
one significant figure.  The calculation is illustrated for the 241Pu mass concentration in sample SF-4-2: 
 
sampleg
Pug10×3
=
95.97
010.0
×
sampleg
Pug10×67.3
=
Pu%WtTIMS
Pu%WtTIMS
×
sampleg
g,Pu
=
sampleg
g,Pu 24182394
239
241239241 __
 
 
The total plutonium concentrations were calculated as the sums of the individual 238, 239, 240, 241, and 
242 isotopes for each sample. 
 
 
3.3 Interpretation of Chemical/Radiochemical Findings 
 
As shown in the preceding discussions, the sample analyses for the SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12 suspect fuel 
items indicate that these materials are fairly similar to each other.  All three fuel rod items contain slightly 
irradiated UO2 fuel, likely originally of natural enrichment, with zirconium cladding.  Samples from all 
three showed similar dissolution behaviors, leaving small quantities of residue that were not soluble in the 
mixed HNO3/HCl, HF, or mixed HNO3/HF. 
 
The composition of the uranium in the 235U and 236U isotopes gives evidence that the fuel was initially of 
natural enrichment.  Depletion in 235U concentration and in-growth of 236U occur when uranium is 
exposed to thermal neutron flux as would occur in a reactor.  The depletion of 235U occurs because of 
fission and because of neutron capture to form 236U.  The thermal neutron fission cross-section for 235U is 
585 barns while the thermal neutron capture cross-section to form 236U is 99 barns (KAPL 2002).  
Therefore, the total 235U depletion cross-section is 585 + 99 = 684 barns.  The ratio of 235U depletion to 
236U formation is 684/99 = 6.9 for uranium exposed to thermal neutrons.  Assuming that the uranium in 
the suspect fuel was initially of natural enrichment, the 235U depletion divided by the 236U production were 
5.6, 8.3, 10.0, 3.3, 8.0, and 2.5 for the six analyzed SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12 samples, respectively.  The 
average ratio of 6.3 ± 3.0 is consistent, within analytical error, with the fuel originally being of natural 
enrichment.  
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It also was observed for each item that samples taken near the fuel rod centers (SF-4-1, SF-8-1, and 
SF-12-3) endured more irradiation than the complementary samples taken from the fuel rod ends (SF-4-2, 
SF-8-2, and SF-12-2, respectively).  This is manifest, in each case, by the 137Cs, 154Eu, 237Np, 241Am, and 
total plutonium concentrations being higher in the center samples than in the ends while the 239Pu and 
(generally) 235U atom% concentrations are lower.  These differences are more pronounced for the SF-8 
and SF-12 samples than for the SF-4 samples.  The SF-4 fuel apparently underwent more irradiation than 
the SF-8 and SF-12 samples, whose irradiation exposures seem to be similar given their similar 
radionuclide concentrations. 
 
Recall that radiological dose readings of each rod (except 13) were made underwater at KW (Ball 2005). 
The dose rates for each rod ranged from 2½ to 11 R/hour (versus 1 R/hour background), except those of 
rods 6 and 7, which were at background. The dose rates were higher at the centers than at the ends (see 
Table A.1).  The observed rod dose rates were significantly lower than were observed for single pass 
reactor fuel (~50 R/hour) and for N Reactor fuel piece scrap (off-scale at 200 R/hour).  The irradiation 
exposure and radionuclide concentration trends observed in the present characterization testing thus are 
consistent with the dose rate observations made for the individual suspect fuel rods at KW.  An 
appreciation of the influence of irradiation exposure can be seen in comparing the concentrations of two 
analytes that were measured with relatively good precision, 137Cs, the most prominent fission product, and 
plutonium, the most prominent nuclear breeding product.  The correlation is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Measurements of fuel diameter, mass per unit length (for the fueled portions without end caps), and 
cladding thickness, described in Section 2.2.2, may be interpreted in light of knowledge that the cladding 
is zirconium (likely Zircaloy-2, or Zr-2) and the fuel material is UO2.  The dimensional analyses, given in 
Appendix B, show that the cladding in these lengths of end cap-free fuel rod comprises 15.1 wt% of the 
fuel segment or, conversely, the UO2 fuel is 84.9% of the fuel rod mass.  This compares well with results 
from the fuel digestion which showed, as derived from values in Table 3.1, that the undissolved cladding 
rings represented 16.1 ± 1.5% of the initial fuel disk mass.  The dimensional analyses show, in addition, 
that the density of the UO2 within the fuel rods is 9.83 g/cm3 or ~90% of the theoretical density of UO2. 
 
[Pu, µg/g] = 0.838 [137Cs, µCi/g]
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Figure 3.3.  Correlation of Plutonium Concentration to 137Cs Concentration in Suspect Fuel Samples 
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Based on the prior review of Hanford technical literature, it was surmised that the suspect fuel rods were 
produced during fuel design studies conducted in the late 1950s for the New Production Reactor (NPR; 
which subsequently became the N Reactor).  Among the fuel types being studied were 7-rod clusters 
which had a single center rod and six rods arranged radially around the center one (Kratzer 1958).  These 
test fuel rods had Zr-2 cladding with 0.56-inch diameter and 0.030-inch thickness and contained natural 
UO2 of 85% theoretical density.  The SF-4, SF-8, and SF-12 items match, within measurement 
uncertainty, the Kratzer (1958) items, having zirconium cladding with 0.56-inch diameter and 0.031-inch 
thickness and containing irradiated natural UO2 of ~90% theoretical density. 
 
In addition, the test fuel described by Kratzer (1958) has pin-type end caps and wire-wrap (of 0.075-inch 
diameter) on a 10-inch pitch, similar to the suspect fuel items SF-12 and SF-5 which have pin-type end 
caps and wire-wrap (estimated ~0.1-inch diameter) with wire wrap markings on the cladding.  Fuel item 
SF-4 has markings suggesting wire wrap on a ~12-inch pitch.  Item SF-8 has a flat end cap with v- or y-
shaped slots while SF-4 was cut at both ends and thus has no surviving end cap.  Reports of test fuel 
prepared in the late 1950s with slotted flat end-caps, similar to that of SF-8, to accommodate rounded 
triangular “spider” supports were described in the letter report survey [see footnote (a) in the Introduction 
section of the present report]. 
   
Schwinkendorf (2006) calculated isotope inventories for such fuel based on nominal 0.5-inch fuel rod 
diameter as found in the present suspect fuel and two 235U isotopic enrichments, 1.3% and 1.6%, as 
functions of irradiation exposure.  The irradiation conditions chosen were those of the KE Reactor test 
loop which was used in much of the NPR fuel development testing.  The plutonium production and 240Pu 
concentrations arising from the 1.3% and 1.6% 235U enriched fuel as functions of irradiation exposure 
according to these calculations are summarized in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7.  Calculated Plutonium Production in Seven-Rod Cluster  
Prototype Fuel of 1.3 and 1.6 Wt% 235U Enrichment  
(taken from Tables 2 and 3, Schwinkendorf 2006) 
Exposure, MWD/metric ton U Parameter, 
1.3% 235U 0 778 1621 2556 3581 3860 
g Pu/MTU 0 440 890 1330 1750 1860 
240Pu, % 0 3 6 9 12 12.776 
Exposure, MWD/metric ton U Parameter, 
1.6% 235U 0 921 1920 3025 3818 3860 
g Pu/MTU 0 450 910 1360 1660 1670 
240Pu, % 0 3 6 9 11 11.103 
 
The data given in Table 3.7 were regressed to obtain the following equations to calculate the exposure as 
functions of the plutonium concentration and 240Pu concentration, respectively, based on the 1.3% 235U 
fuel: 
  
• Exposure, MWD/metric ton U = 2.550×10-4 [Pu, g/103 kg U]2 + 1.598 [Pu, g/103 kg U] 
 
• Exposure, MWD/metric ton U = 4.638 [240Pu, atom% isotope]2 + 2.427×102 [240Pu, atom% isotope]  
 
and 1.6% enriched fuel: 
 
• Exposure, MWD/metric ton U = 2.434×10-4 [Pu, g/103 kg U]2 + 1.899 [Pu, g/103 kg U] 
 
• Exposure, MWD/metric ton U = 5.278 [240Pu, atom% isotope]2 + 2.899×102 [240Pu, atom% isotope]. 
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As indicated by the slight depletion in 235U, the presence of 236U shown in the TIMS results (Table 3.4), 
and the ratios of the 235U depletion to 236U in-growth, the suspect fuel likely was natural uranium, or 
0.72 atom% 235U, before irradiation.  Lacking an equation for natural uranium, the results of the present 
analyses for 1.3% and 1.6% enriched uranium were used to estimate the irradiation exposure (burnup) in 
the suspect fuel samples.  The results, given in Table 3.8, would show lower estimated exposure assuming 
that the trends observed between 1.6% and 1.3% enrichment continued from 1.3% enrichment down to 
natural enrichment at 0.72% 235U.  As expected, the exposures estimated for the center samples were 
greater than those of the corresponding end samples though the differences between the respective SF-4 
samples were relatively small.  The exposures estimated for the SF-4 samples also were greater than those 
of the SF-8 or SF-12 samples. 
 
Table 3.8.  Estimated Irradiation Exposure of Suspect Fuel Samples Based on Correlations 
for 1.3 and 1.6 Wt% Enriched Fuel Irradiated in the KE Reactor 
SF-4 SF-8 SF-12 
SF-4-1 SF-4-2 SF-8-1 SF-8-2 SF-12-3 SF-12-2 Analysis Basis 
Center Near End Center Near End Center Near End
1.3% 235U Estimated Exposure, MWD/metric ton U 
g Pu/MTU 802 715 551 346 517 341 
240Pu, % 570 512 382 215 351 247 
1.6% 235U Estimated Exposure, MWD/metric ton U 
g Pu/MTU 940 839 648 409 608 402 
240Pu, % 660 596 450 257 415 295 
 
Because 241Pu decays to 241Am with a 14.4-year half-life (meaning 0.04814 of the 241Pu decays per year), 
the fuel cooling times can be estimated based on the following equation and the relative 241Pu and 241Am 
concentrations: 
year/04814.0
)Am+Pu(
Pu
ln
=years,timeCooling
241241
241
e
_
 
 
The results, shown in Table 3.9, are somewhat reproducible for SF-4, which has the most precise 241Pu 
and 241Am measurements, but poor to non-existent for SF-8 and SF-12.  The uncertainties in the cooling 
times are estimated based on the 1-σ errors of the respective 241Pu and 241Am measurements. 
 
Table 3.9.  Estimated Cooling Times Based on Relative 241Pu and 241Am Concentrations 
SF-4 SF-8 SF-12 
SF-4-1 SF-4-2 SF-8-1 SF-8-2 SF-12-3 SF-12-2 Analysis 
Center Near End Center Near End Center Near End
241Pu, µg/g diss. fuel 8.89E-02 3.87E-02 9.17E-02 1.15E-01 1.11E-02 2.99E-02
241Am, µg/g diss. fuel 2.92E-01 2.49E-01 9.69E-02 2.95E-02 <6.E-2 <3.E-2 
Cooling Time, y(a) 30±6 42±14 15±8 5±7 – – 
(a)  Cooling time uncertainties based on 1-σ errors in 241Pu and 241Am analyses. 
 
For SF-4, the cooling times indicate a discharge date between ~1964 and 1976.  The likely discharge 
dates, if the fuel had been produced during NPR development testing, would be in the late 1950s.  The 
laboratory could provide better estimates of cooling time by extraction and counting measurements for 
241Am, which are more reliable than the reported GEA measurements, and by liquid scintillation counting 
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of purified plutonium fractions to quantify 241Pu by its beta decay peak.  The present 241Am measurements 
suffered high background count rates caused by Compton scattering from high 137Cs concentrations while 
the 241Pu TIMS measurements were near or below the detection limit.  Because the accuracy of the 
present measurements satisfies the original required accuracy objectives given in the SAP for 241Am and 
241Pu, further analyses of 241Am and 241Pu to obtain better estimates of cooling time were not performed. 
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4.0  Quality Assurance and Control Summary 
  
 
The physical examinations and the laboratory analyses performed on the suspect fuel were conducted in 
accordance with the SAP (Baker et al. 2006) and the Analytical Support Operations (ASO) Quality 
Assurance Plan and procedures, which are consistent with the criteria identified in the applicable sections 
of the OCRWM Quality Assurance Requirements and Description document (DOE 2003).    
 
Table 3.2 summarizes the key analytical QC sample requirements and acceptance criteria specified in the 
SAP.  The SAP QC requirements, including all detection limits, were met for all the analyses, with the 
exception of a small group of deficiencies (summarized below).  Based on the assessment of these 
deficiencies, through a corrective action review discussed in detail within the Technical Data Package, it 
was concluded that the deficiencies as resolved did not have a significant impact on overall data quality 
and further corrective action was unnecessary.  All ASO laboratory procedures and QC sample 
requirements were met. 
 
Total Uranium Analyses   
 
The U-KPA “blank spike” prepared in the hot cell recovered at an un-expectedly high recovery of 263%, 
which significantly exceeded the ± 20% accuracy criterion identified in the SAP.  An investigation was 
conducted, and it was concluded that the low levels of uranium observed in the “process blank” were an 
indication that the overall environment in the hot cell was not contaminated with the high levels of 
uranium that would be needed to account for the high blank spike recovery.  The U-KPA instrument 
calibration and calibration verification show that the instrument was performing within the QC 
requirements for the method and the SAP (calibration verification achieved was ± 4% vs. SAP criterion of 
± 7.5%).  Additional uranium present in the blank spike was most likely the result of the spill of the fuel 
sample during the sample digestion (see Section 3.2.1).  If a similar quantity of additional uranium was 
present in any of the suspect fuel samples, the effect on measured uranium content would be insignificant 
(i.e., it would have contributed less than 1% of the measured uranium - within the reported measurement 
uncertainty of ± 4%).   
 
The SAP identified a U-KPA matrix spike; however, because the requirement for a “true duplicate” was 
removed during a revision of the SAP, the requirement for a matrix spike sample by U-KPA should have 
been also omitted during that SAP revision.  
 
Neptunium and Plutonium Analyses   
 
The SAP specifies that counter instruments will be checked daily with counter control samples to ensure 
performance is within statistical process control criteria.  However, the AEA systems do not have a 
counter control check standard run (as is done for the gamma spectrum analyses-GEA), but rely on other 
equivalent measures to ensure data accuracy and quality control.  The AEA systems do undergo a primary 
calibration where the detector efficiencies are determined using NIST-traceable standard sources.  
Routine calibration verification checks of the alpha counters are not performed due to the concern of 
potential contamination of the counter.   
 
For the plutonium AEA isotopic analyses, 242Pu was used as the isotopic tracer in each sample and one 
matrix spike for the sample batch was prepared.  The tracer was added to all samples and the tracer 
recovery was used to normalize the final results of the other Pu isotopes detected.  The use of the isotopic 
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tracer provides an internal standard with each sample.  In the case of this batch Pu isotopic analysis, the 
tracer recovery ranged from 76% to 106% in the samples.  The matrix spike sample prepared with the 
Pu-AEA had a recovery of 70% (with an associated 28% uncertainty).  The quantity of spike added to the 
sample was small compared to the sample concentration and resulted in higher uncertainty and variability 
in the matrix spike recovery calculation.  The quantity of spike used was determined by evaluation of 
gross alpha information and a best professional judgment estimate of spike quantity to use was made.  
Without knowing in advance of the exact amount of Pu present in the sample, the matrix spike sample is 
susceptible to being outside the optimal level for 100% recovery.  [Note:  The SAP does not specifically 
call out a matrix spike for Pu-AEA; however, the SAP includes a footnote stating matrix spike recoveries 
should be within ± 25%.] 
 
The neptunium AEA analysis does not have the advantage of using an isotopic tracer because alpha-
emitting isotopic tracers for neptunium analyses are not available.  The sample batch did include a blank 
spike (81%) and matrix spike (94%) with recoveries within the QC acceptance criteria for the method and 
SAP.   
PNNL-15939, Rev. 1 
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Table A.1.  Summary of In-Basin Characterizations of Suspect Fuel Rod Pieces and Listing of Pieces Identified for Laboratory Analyses  
(from Baker et al. 2006) (All measurements made underwater, before shipment of select fuel rod pieces to PNNL) 
Length, Inches(a) Piece to Hot Cells? Suspect 
Fuel Rod Piece 
Number Piece  Fuel
Measured 
Fuel Piece Mass 
(Underwater),(a)
Pounds 
Fuel Type 
Based on 
Measured 
Density(a)
RO-7 Probe 
Reading,(b)
R/hr 
Clad Outside 
Diameter, 
In. 
Ship to 325 
Bldg 
Analyze or 
Hold as 
Contingent 
1 20.5 20 1.45 Oxide 5 - 8 0.55 No NA 
2 17.38 17.5 1.20 Oxide 8 - 11 0.55 No NA 
3 18 17.75 1.26 Oxide 3 - 6 0.55 No NA 
4 9.75 9 0.55 Oxide 6 - 7 0.55 Yes Analyze 
5         9.50 9 0.50 Oxide 5.5 0.55 Yes Hold
6        21.38 NA 0.00 Empty 1 0.60 No NA
7         6 NA 0.10 Empty 1 0.50 No NA
8 12.88 12.38 0.90 Oxide 5 - 7 0.55 Yes Analyze 
9 15.5 14.5 0.95 Oxide 5.5 - 7.5 0.55 No NA 
10 17.5 17 1.25 Oxide 4.5 - 5.5 0.55 No NA 
11 6.88 6.38 0.95 Uranium metal 4.5 - 8.5 0.55 No NA 
12        13 12.5 0.95 Oxide 4.5 - 5.5 0.55 Yes Analyze
13          6 TBD TBD Dropped TBD Not read 0.55 No NA
14         2.63 NA 0.05 Empty 3.5 0.55 No NA
15         2.63 NA 0.00 Empty 2.5 0.55 No NA
Notes:   NA = not applicable.   TBD = to be determined.  Items (in bold) were shipped to RPL for examinations and analysis. 
(a)  Duncan, DR and JP Sloughter.  2005.  Internal Memo to AB Carlson (DFSNW) et al., Characterization of Legacy Fuel [“Suspect Plutonium Recycle 
Test Reactor (PRTR) Fuel”] to Support Shipment to 325 Building, 05-KBC/DRD-002 (dated November 22, 2005), Fluor Hanford Inc., Richland, 
WA.  This memo is also provided as Appendix B of the SAP (KBC-29054, Baker et al. 2006). 
(b)  Ball 2005. Background was approximately 1 R/hr.  Readings tended to be lower at the ends of the pins and higher in the center. 
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B.1 Sectioning and Labeling Diagrams 
 
 
 
Figure B.1.  Final Sectioning and Labeling Diagram for Suspect Fuel Rod Piece SF-4 
(Graphic is simplified – fuel actually extends out each tapered end of rod piece  
as noted in Section 2.2) 
 
 
 
Figure B.2.  Final Sectioning and Labeling Diagram for Suspect Fuel Rod Piece SF-8 
[Note:  Fueled section was assumed to begin ⅛ inch from reference end.]  
 SF-4-R3              SF-4-R2                          SF-4-R1                     
9.88 in.
7.8 in. with fuel
2 1/4 in.
2 7/8 in.  
SF-4-1
SF-4-Fuel 
SF-4-Clad 
SF-4-2
4 3/8 in.
Cut Reference  
Fuel 7/8 in. from end 
       SF-8-R3                  SR-8-R2                                   SF-8-R1 
13.0 in.
12.63 in. with fuel
2 3/8 in. 
SF-8-1
SF-8-Fuel 
SF-8-Clad 
SF-8-2
Cut Reference 
End with Plug 
(flat fitting) 
3 3/4 in. 6 7/16 in.
Open 
end 
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Figure B.3.  Final Sectioning and Labeling Diagram for Suspect Fuel Rod Piece SF-12 
[Note:  Fueled section was assumed to begin ⅜ inch from fueled end.] 
 
SF-12-R3                SF-12-R2                             SF-12-R1
13 5/16 in.
12.69 in. with fuel
4 ¼ in.
1 7/8 in. 
SF-12-3
Cut Reference 
End with Pin 
Fitting  
Bent 
End 
SF-12-Fuel 
SNF-12-Clad 
6 ¾ in.
SF-12-1
SF-12-2
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B.2 Mass and Dimensions of Remnants After Fuel Sectioning 
 
Table B.1 provides information (length and mass) of the remnant pieces created during the 
section/subsampling of the suspect fuel rod pieces.  As shown in Figures B.1 through B.3, remnant pieces 
labeled “R2” are completely fueled and were used to determine the mass per unit length of fueled rod 
piece provided in Table 2.2. 
 
Table B.1.  Mass and Dimensions of Remnants After Suspect Fuel Sectioning 
Remnant 
Piece Parameter SF-4 SF-8 SF-12 
length, inches 4.38 6.44 6.75 
R1 
mass, g 118.8 224.5 232.9 
length, inches 2.25 3.75 4.25 
R2 
mass, g 82.2 136.4 155.3 
length, inches 2.88 2.38 1.88 
R3 
mass, g 73.9 66.9 37.3 
Scrap(a) mass, g 3.7 3.4 3.8 
 
Remnants Total mass, g 278.6 431.2 429.3 
(a)  Primarily, material remaining from sample disk after collecting clad and fuel 
sample for XRD analysis. 
 
 
 
B.3 Calculations on Make-Up of Suspect Fuel:  Weight Percent Cladding 
and Fuel Density 
 
The weight fraction of zirconium cladding in the fuel sections and the density of the UO2 fuel within the 
measured suspect fuel rods may be calculated based on the data given in Table 2.2 and the density of 
Zircaloy-2, the likely zirconium metal cladding material.  Zircaloy-2 contains ~1.5 wt% tin, ~0.12 wt% 
iron, ~0.09 wt% chromium, ~0.05 wt% nickel, and the balance zirconium (Weakley 1979). 
 
Thus, the following facts are known about the fuel: 
 
• The average mass per length of the end cap-free fueled rod sections is 36.49 g/inch (from Table 2.2). 
• The cladding thickness is 0.031 inch. 
• The average outer fuel rod diameter is 0.557 inch (0.55, 0.55, and 0.56 inch for SF-4, SF-8, and 
SF-12, respectively). 
• The theoretical density of UO2 is 10.95 g/cm3 (Weigel 1986). 
• The density of Zr-2 is 6.55 g/cm3 (Weakley 1979). 
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The following statements may be made about the fuel rod by calculation: 
 
• The diameter of the UO2 cylinders within the fuel is 0.557 - (2 × 0.031) = 0.495 inch. 
• The volume of a 1-inch fuel rod segment is π (0.557/2)2 × 1 = 0.244 in3 = 3.933 cm3. 
• The volume of the UO2 fuel in a 1-inch segment is π (0.495/2)2 × 1 = 0.192 in3 = 3.15 cm3. 
• The volume of a 1-inch length of cladding is 3.93 - 3.15 cm3 = 0.839 cm3. 
• The mass of cladding in a 1-inch length is 0.839 cm3 × 6.55 g/cm3 = 5.50 g Zr-2. 
• The mass of fuel in a 1-inch length is 36.49 - 5.50 = 30.99 g. 
• The fuel rod is 100 × 5.50 / 36.49 = 15.1 wt% cladding.  This may be compared with, and is 
consistent with, 16.1 ± 1.5 wt% as measured for fuel rod disks based on the data in Table 3.1. 
• The density of the UO2 in the fuel is 30.99 g / 3.15 cm3 = 9.83 g/cm3. 
• The UO2 fuel density is 100 × 9.83 / 10.95 = ~90% of theoretical UO2 density. 
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